Families of children with diabetes increasingly obtain health information from a variety of sources. Doctor-patient relationships have accordingly become more fluid and dynamic with input from other parties. These outside parties include representatives from the diabetes health care industry-industry third parties (ITPs). This review is an exploration of the ethical principles and cognitive processes involved when doctors and patients negotiate around health care practices and the role of ITPs in that dialogue. Ethical principles of conflicts of interest, beneficence (act in the best interests of the patient), non-maleficence (act so as to do no harm) and justice (act so as to allocate resources fairly or justly) are relevant considerations. Reflexive and analytic thinking and various cognitive biases also play a significant part in clinical decision making.
| INTRODUCTION
The current renaissance period of modern science has provided a bewildering array of novel therapies and interventions. Many have proven to be highly effective in broad (eg, cardiovascular drugs) and specific (eg, oncology regimens) patients groups. However, others have proved to be both expensive and non-transformative. Mis-directed use of some interventions has proved to be counter-therapeutic leading to over-diagnosis, with unnecessary and potentially harmful subsequent clinical interactions (eg, breast screening, prostate-specific antigen testing 1 ). In this milieu, the role of the clinician continues to be as a diagnostician, therapist, and advocate who provides advice and guidance that should be in the best interests of their patient. The "doctor-patient relationship" has been the cornerstone of health care since antiquity. 2 This fiduciary relationship 3 has traditionally been seen as a sacrosanct dyad analogous to relationships between lawyers and clients or priests and parishioners.
Increasingly although, the traditional doctor-patient relationship has been challenged by growing recognition of the need for patient health literacy, 4 increasing patient empowerment, 5 disruptive patterns of knowledge transfer and personalized medicine. 6 Many would argue that these changes address an imbalance in power and control between therapist and client and are thus both inevitable and appropriate to current mores. The move away from a paternalistic paradigm has created a more dynamic nexus where roles and inputs are more fluid. This fluidity allows for third parties to influence the interaction-either directly or indirectly, be they family members, friends, members of social media communities, or other parties with an interest in the outcomes of therapeutic decisions. This last group includes health care funders and industry providers. 7, 8 The purpose of this analysis is to consider how clinical decision making within the doctor-patient relationship might be impacted upon by industry third parties (ITPs) in pediatric type 1 diabetes care. The emerging involvement of ITPs will e examined through a dispassionate prism of ethical and cognitive decision-making analysis.
| Two's company in type 1 diabetes care: rationale for focusing on the doctor-patient relationship
Most type 1 diabetes care in pediatrics occurs in specialist multidisciplinary team settings that involve a number of specialist health care providers. 9 In this context, much of the focus is on fostering health literacy and self-efficacy by the allied health team with an attendant degree of patient contact. Given the myriad of team players in pediatric type 1 diabetes care, it can be easy to underestimate the role of the family's rela- doctors, ITPs, and health care in general all benefit from patient care in a successful economy), the distinction between the two can begin to blur.
Attempting to adjudicate on the degree of conflictedness of the various players in a clinical encounter to resolve the issue of ITP involvement is thus a fraught endeavor. It would seem reasonable to assume that almost all participants enter a doctor-patient relationship with the intent of beneficence, with the end goal being the improvement in the patients condition. Even ITPs with a profit motive may be assumed to have, at the very least, a non-maleficent attitude to patient well-being, since harm to patients will not promote the interests of ITPs in the long run. Given this broad commonality of purpose, an examination of the motivations of the various players is unlikely to be either discriminating or enlightening.
1.4 | What are the ethical considerations?
| Autonomy and choice
Going to the ethical heart of the matter might be a more fruitful approach. The principle of respect for autonomy is central to medical ethics. It requires that medical professionals respect patients' right to self-determination and to make informed choices about their own health and care in accordance with their personal values and wishes. 3 In medical ethics, it is generally accepted that autonomy should be balanced alongside the principles of beneficence (act in the best interests of the patient), non-maleficence (act so as to do no harm) and justice (act so as to allocate resources fairly or justly). 20 are increasingly prone to the cognitive biases typical of the consumer in a commercial relationship, rather than a patient in a fiduciary relationship. 22 Their ability to make independent decisions may be impacted upon by their emotional investment in the communication process (ie, they have gone outside usual channels to seek out advice, so they are likely to give it more weight). This could be potentially exacerbated by contextual vulnerability of being recipients of a sole service ITP-provider in areas where traditional health care resources are scarce. All of this occurs in the inevitable context of sophisticated consumer marketing. 23 This raises the question of whether engagement with ITPs that is motivated by a perception of limited options within the doctor-patient relationship really empowers patients and makes them more autonomous in their decision making. The considerations just cited suggest not.
| Non-maleficence, beneficence, justice, and health care value
What of the need to balance autonomy with non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice? Is the treatment or intervention being promoted by an ITP potentially harmful? Does it work? Does investment in it redirect resources away from other health care priorities? While concepts, such as personalized medicine and disciplines like pharmacogenomics promise much in highly individualized and tailored therapies, they can raise concerns regarding non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. Indeed, the underbelly of personalized medicine is that highly specialized and effective therapies designed for patients with particular characteristics may be extremely expensive and "budget-busting"
to health care systems. Examples of these include combined immunotherapy regimens used in oncology 24 and so-called "orphan drugs" for rare diseases. 25 Alternatively, there may more conventional therapies that are designed for a broader patient group that are of only marginal benefit, have significant risk profiles and with marginal to negative cost-benefit or financial hardship. 26, 27 Finally, some unregulated therapies may be either harmful or low value, either causing direct patient harm or anguish because of unmet expectations. 28 When issues of distributive justice are not addressed, inequities can be created where, within one health care system, some patients can access expensive, non-transformative therapies, while others cannot access basic, proven, and life-saving therapies. 29 When a therapy has minimal benefit, or the potential harm outweighs potential benefits, it is deemed low-value health care. Lowvalue health care places significant burdens on health care costs and is currently the target of international health care professional campaigns such as 'Choosing Wisely (http://www.choosingwisely.org/).
Traditionally, it has been the role of health care regulators and treating clinicians within the public health care system to try and balance these imperatives of individual autonomy and benefit to the individual patient with distributive justice. This is arguably the most highly con- 1.5 | Why do people make the decisions they do? ).
In response to a comment that the Cochrane Reviews had shown limited benefits of insulin pump therapy, the refrain "we should ignore the Cochrane reviews and randomized control trial data when we know they are wrong" was received with applause. In its extreme form, motivated reasoning can be associated with what the Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman called "Cargo-cult science"-practices that have the semblance of being scientific, but do not in fact follow the scientific method. 33 Feynman emphasized the need to look at all of the evidence and "not just the information that leads to judgment in one particular direction or another". 33 In the field of clinical diabetes care, Edwin Gale summarized the same phenomenon: "One needs to consider the facts before generating a theory or run the risk of prematurely generating a theory to which the facts are made to fit.". 34 
| Cognitive biases, system 1 and system 2 thinking
More recently, another Nobel Laureate, Daniel Kahneman, described two systems of cognition in his well-known book "Thinking, fast, and slow". 35 In this treatise, Kahneman describes System 1 thinking, which is intuitive, automatic, fast, and effortless, and System 2 thinking which is analytic, conscious, slow, and requires more work. People usually prefer to rely on System 1 thinking for obvious reasons. System 1 thinking is generally useful in routine problem solving although it can lead to significant and systematic errors. 36 System 1 thinking is limited by an individual's heuristics (experiential mindlines or mental shortcuts), which in turn are sensitive to a variety of biases. Clinicians appear to be subject to their own heuristics and cognitive bias in medical decision making. 37, 38 In a clinical context, biases that result in the persistence of low-value care outcomes include: omission regret (wanting to avoid regret at not administering an intervention which may have benefited at least a few recipients); attribution bias (overconfidence, illusion of control); impact bias (over-estimation of benefits and under-estimation of harms of interventions); affect bias (initially favorable impressions of an intervention result in lasting attitude of benefits despite subsequent evidence to the contrary); availability bias (testimonial recall of noteworthy though unrepresentative cases); extrapolation bias (indication creep); and uncertainty bias (over-investigation or treatment to reduce anxiety). 39 Such biases may also lead researchers to fall prey to framing effects (presenting data in a favorable manner, eg, changes in relative risk rather than absolute risk 40, 41 ) or surrogate marker effects (pathophysiologic sophistry with a surrogate outcome measure that does not necessarily equate to a biologically relevant outcome). Marketing and advertising campaigns are generally designed to appeal to System 1 thinking. The novelty, attribution and extrapolation biases in particular are central to most ITP marketing campaigns ('It's new, it's brilliant and it will work for you!') or company sponsored postmarketing studies. 42 When ITP marketing campaigns are directed at experienced clinicians and patients, there is the potential for a very powerful synergy between motivated reasoning and System 1 thinking, 43 appealing to bias, belief and an "eminence-base" in any subsequent decision process.
System 2 thinking, on the other hand, is underscored by the notion that "data is not the plural of anecdote". 44 While it is usually considered as a form of mental processing for an individual, System 2 thinking can also be considered a description of collective decision making. Rigorous evidence-based reviews undertaken by science pro- Billy's parents occasionally participate in a social media diabetes support group. This group strongly advocates for insulin pump therapy for children with diabetes. Billy's parents have been directed to a device company representative who states that she is a clinical nurse specialist and that in her opinion an insulin pump would be a good idea for Billy. Billy's parents lobby their local community Rotary group to raise funds for a pump for his "life-threatening" diabetes. The pump is purchased and at the next clinic visit, the treating team are shown the pump and "told" by his parents that Billy must start on the pump immediately.
The treating team does not wish to start Billy on pump therapy.
They have serious reservations about his ability to adhere to self-care tasks involved in pump therapy; particularly, given ongoing poor levels of parental supervision. They think that pump therapy will potentially put Billy at a greater risk of an adverse clinical outcome. Billy's parents react angrily, stating that they have been told that the pump will sort While this line of reasoning appears logical, it is potentially influenced by novelty bias ("it's new so it must be good"), attribution bias ("it's the pump that will improve things"), anecdotal bias ("my online support friends" "child did really well on a pump") and extrapolation bias ("it works for some so it must work for everybody"). A System 1 heuristic approach to the ethical issues in this context and decisions affected by various cognitive biases may conclude that Billy should receive pump therapy.
A System 2 thinking approach would, among other things, recognize the conflict of interest for the device company representative and the advice proffered. However, rather than simply decry this, a System 2 thinking approach might instead focus on the many ethical and cognitive nuances at play in this situation). While parental autonomy is important, it does not necessarily carry the same ethical weight as the autonomy of the adult patient of sound mind. Parental autonomy is limited by consideration of a child's interests and well-being. 47 Will pump therapy definitely improve things? Consideration of the randomized control trial and observational data suggests not. [48] [49] [50] Moreover, past behavior is a strong predictor of future behavior, 51 so Billy's lack of parental supervision and his own poor self-care would seem to make him an unlikely candidate to improve on pump therapy. 52 Could the pump in fact be harmful to Billy? This is the crucial ethical question, because respect for parental autonomy does not justify acquiescing to parental requests that put a child at risk of significant harm. 53 Insulin pumps can malfunction or be misused resulting in serious lifethreatening adverse consequences, such as diabetic ketoacidosis. 63 In public health care systems, allocation of health care resources should be done in a way that acknowledges each person's equal right to a fair share of those resources. Fair shares are not determined on the basis of individual desires, but on need and capacity to benefit. A clinical team can do this using an evidence base or clinical decision support tool to decide which patients will receive the greatest benefit and least harm from the therapeutic option in question. 64 One could make a strong case that a pump would be an example of low-value care in Billy's case. Acquiescing to the family's demands would be both abrogating the moral responsibility of stewardship over clinical resources and antithetical to a clinical decision support approach. It is not inconceivable that Billy might have some sort of clinical epiphanic moment after commencing pump therapy, and dramatically improve his adherence and glucose control. However, such an outcome would appear to be so highly unlikely that a reasonable case could not be made for pump therapy being high-value care for him.
What of the potential for cognitive bias to affect this clinical decision? A System 2 thinking approach recognizes that cognitive bias is implicit in all human decision making. For example, there is a potential bias (or motivated reasoning) generated by the frustration and irritation that Billy's doctors are highly likely to be feeling toward this family. 65 Billy's parents have ignored medical advice, failed to recognize their own contribution to Billy's poor diabetic control, and manipulated money out of the Rotary club that could arguably have been better used for other purposes. Deciding a particular point of view is wrong, because one does not like the person putting it forward ("shooting the messenger"), is a known type of bias. Interpretation of data is also subject to bias. While the potential for bias can be minimized through an evidence-based approach, one has to be cognizant of how that evidence is assessed, the potential for framing effects, surrogate marker effects and availability bias, and be wary of being drawn to an intellectual echo chamber. The use of high-quality metaanalyses underpinning clinical decision support tools should minimize these biases. On a more layered System 2 ethical analysis with an emphasis on high-value care, the clinical evidence, balancing the probability of outcomes, and deeper reflection on the relevant ethical considerations, the conclusion is that Billy should not commence pump 
| CONCLUSION
There is an inevitability of ITP's joining the dialogue that normally occurs between doctors and their patients. This can occur at many levels including the lobbying of regulatory bodies, use of social media by patients and parents, traditional marketing campaigns, and direct financial support of physicians, research programs and patient groups.
While some would argue that these activities are harmful to patients, 16 they appear unlikely to dissipate. Accordingly, clinicians may feel that their role has been diminished. But the literature appears to indicate that this is not the case. 10 A recent meta-analysis of factors that influence medication adherence showed that the doctor is still the primary source of reinforcement when it comes to health-related behavior. 67 Given this continuing influence, clinicians have an added fiduciary responsibility to consider the ethical imperatives and cognitive processes that form a backdrop to these ITP interactions, in order to avoid low-value health care outcomes. In the context of an evolving dynamic of doctor-patient relationships with ITPs, the "ethical cognition" approach discussed in this paper can offset the motivated reasoning and System 1 thinking of both parents and doctors that is generated by the marketing campaigns of ITPs. 
